Governments with transitional economies have applied different privatisation methods, from an almost free distribution to the direct sales of state assets. While a free distribution was believed to ensure the political feasibility of the program and its fairness, direct sales, or more generally, standard privatisation methods had a significant advantage in creating concentrated ownership structures as the prerequisite to corporate control and restructuring. Many economists believe that the two goals of mass privatisation, political feasibility and creation of proper ownership incentives, contradict each other and recent empirical comparisons of enterprises seem to support their view. However, all empirical works have been based on the weak assumption that privatisation methods were applied on a randomly selected samples of enterprises, which then allowed for a direct comparison between these enterprises. Our main claim is that governments indeed selected enterprises non-randomly and therefore, the resulting selection bias must be incorporated into the analyses. To show this, we apply a Heckman two-step regression method on a sample of 559 Czech enterprises. The main point of this paper then is that performance is influenced by the selection process and combination of vouchers with outsider owners is preferred over 100% voucherisation. 
Introduction
There is now a large economic literature on the voucher scheme adopted by the Czech (then the Czechoslovak Federal) government. The more critical roots of that literature contain works by Bolton and Roland (1992) , Dewatripont and Roland (1992) , Roland and Verdier (1994) , Roland (1996) , and Vickers and Yarrow (1991) , who saw the danger of a free distribution of property as leading to budgetary crises and unleashing inflation at the macroeconomic level, and preserving the position of incumbent managers, giving them few incentives to restructure on the microeconomic level. The government was consequently advised to adopt gradual reform (and gradual privatisation), which could be corrected at every step, and thus ensure more credibility to the program. A more positive view on the Czech voucher scheme can be found in papers by Aghion (1993) , and Lipton and Sachs (1990) , who, in contrast, claimed that the fast pace of reform, allowed by the use of vouchers, would give more credibility to the program, and therefore a better chance to succeed. A theoretical background for the speed and credibility argument could be found, for instance, in van Wijnbergen's (1992) paper on the political economy of price reform, or in Rodrik (1989) .
Although the two views on reform speed as a credibility tool were completely opposite in nature, they generally found consensus in bad corporate governance consequences in the implementation of voucher schemes (see for instance Transition Report 1995). First of all, the use of vouchers was believed to create a dispersed ownership unable to affect incumbent managers. Claessens (1995) , Lastovicka et al. (1995) , and Marcincin (1995) showed that this might not be true, as companies could be controlled by small coalitions of investment privatisation funds and other outside owners.
1 Still, the question of whether investment 1 1 We shall try to correct a view on the Czech privatisation program, exhibited for instance in Transition Report 1995, that 50.7% of the realised nominal stock value by December 1994 was privatised by vouchers, while only 7% trough direct sales, and that many companies were from 97% privatised by vouchers. First of all, property estimated at about CZK 70 to 120 billion was privatised through restitution, CZK 21 billion through small privatisation auctions, CZK 200 to 230 billion trough cooperations, CZK 480 through large privatisation and over CZK 350 billion through free transfer to municipalities. Therefore, from total property privatised, estimated at CZK 1,121 to 1,221 billion, less than half was privatised in large privatisation, which also involved the voucher method (estimates of the National Property Fund, Hospodarske noviny, January 23, 1995) . The correct amount of voucher privatisation share on property privatised, 50.7% (almost the same as reported by Hrncirova and Sabela, 1995, 50.6%) , means that about one half of the property privatised in large privatisation went 2 privatisation funds would have proper incentives to be involved in costly monitoring of companies and their corporate control remained open. Second, recent evidence of restructuring changes in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (see for instance Aghion et al., 1994 , Belka et al., 1995 , Pinto et al., 1993 , and Transition Report 1995 , seemed to prove that privatisation methods and restructuring measures often are not correlated (perhaps with the exception of direct sales to foreign investors), and that voucher privatised companies often showed worse results than companies privatised by other methods 2 . Although it was recognised that these comparisons probably suffered from the assumption of no selection bias, they were generally accepted as an empirical proof of a negative influence of the voucher privatisation method on company performance (or restructuring).
It is worth noting that comparisons of performance (or restructuring) of state-owned companies and those privatised in different ways on the basis of their own performance at the beginning of transformation, or just between themselves meet two serious problems. Firstly, an assumption of ceteris paribus is contradicted, because the whole environment in which they had been operating changed tremendously. This has an implication especially on the performance of state-owned companies. Even if they restructured more than privatised companies, the hypothesis that privatisation was not necessary cannot be accepted, because too many other explanatory variables are omitted. In fact, such a test is simply wrongly specified. Secondly, there is likelihood that companies were not selected randomly for privatisation by different methods (or to remain state-owned). Put simply, if foreign investors picked the best enterprises, and the worse were privatised by vouchers, then it should be no surprise that the former would show a much better performance and restructuring today then the latter. The question therefore is whether such selection bias was present, and then whether through vouchers, or that a quarter of total privatised property was privatised by vouchers, while the rest was privatised by free transfers, direct sales, auctions and tenders. Secondly, a median company was privatised by vouchers from 92% in the first, and 81% in the second waves. However, using assets as a weight we come up with an average voucher stake of 64% and 43%, respectively. Note that for the second wave we considered only companies which were not listed in the first wave. See also Mejstrik (1997) .
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voucher privatisation was suitable for the privatisation of selected (presumably bad) enterprises.
In this paper we briefly describe relevant features of the Czech privatisation program, then model the behaviour of the government which hoped to gain support for its reforms from fast privatisation, and thus applied both voucher distribution and direct sales methods. Then we estimate a selection rule from data available at the time of the method decision (1991) and try to estimate several measures, distinguishing between impact of corporate governance type and the selection bias. These measures involved (i) stock exchange prices in April 1995, using fresh financial data on enterprises from 1994, (ii) change in these prices with respect to equilibrium prices in the voucher market, and (iii) direct financial indicators like return on assets, return on equity, and profit margin on sales. Finally, we compare the two groups of companies and discuss the possible benefits of the voucher method for the government.
Description of the Czech privatisation program
The main feature of the Czech reform was that it was fast: In November 1989, people went to the streets. In December 1989, the still-communist parliament elected Vaclav Havel as president of the country. During 1990, the first macroeconomic reforms gradually started being implemented and the legislative background for other parts of the overall reform was being prepared. At the beginning of 1991, small and large privatisation acts were approved by the parliament. In November 1991, voucher booklets, carrying the signature of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, started being sold. In summer 1992, the Klaus-formed party won the general elections (and in December 1992, the country split), and in 1994, the second wave of voucher privatisation took place. Finally, at the end of 1995, the country enjoyed political stability and the largest percentage of private production on GDP in the region.
A detailed look at the reform suggests that Klaus gained credibility for his reform by its fast pace, by overstating its magnitude (as suggested by Rodrik, 1989) , and by not allowing the old nomenclature and incumbent managers to form an opposition to the reform in its later stages (when the status-quo bias was more likely to appear, as in Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991 3 ). All this was quite unlikely without voucher privatisation, which was an integral part of the reform program. Vouchers allowed for the fast pace of the reform, a wide participation of citizens, who started to learn the principles of capitalism, and ensured the irreversibility of the reform.
But at the same time, rapid implementation of voucher privatisation required, in the first place, a rapid preparation of privatisation projects (which would describe in detail each company and how its parts were to be privatised); especially, when vouchers were not the only privatisation method to be applied 4 .
Privatisation projects were prepared by insiders as an obligation, and could also be prepared by anyone else. Out of 11,163 projects submitted by the end of 1992 (for 2,876 companies involved), about 3,500 was selected for implementation; the majority of them were projects submitted by insiders. In the first wave of voucher privatisation, almost 1,000 companies were privatised; the majority of them ended up being owned exclusively by small individual investors and investment privatisation funds. If we accept the logic of dispersed ownership (free-rider problem) and lazy investment privatisation funds, insiders were the ones who mostly benefited from vouchers. Indeed, this was their expectation and thus might have positively influenced their decision not to oppose reforms and the privatisation process. We can clearly see the trade-off between political and economic gains related to the voucher scheme. What actually happened (according to the anecdotal evidence) was that some investment funds were lazy and some were not, thus they stratified insiders into gainers (in the first case) and losers (in the second case).
There is another point linked to vouchers, worth noting. Vouchers often made the investment of direct investors cheaper, because it was enough for them to buy only a small portion of shares, rather than the majority of shares, in order to gain de-facto majority control. They would enter the company if they believed that they could gain fast profits (but such good enterprise would probably be sold for cash in standard sale), or buy the rest for a good price later on. This partial buy-in could also positively balance the uncertainty of the economic and political environment. Thus vouchers can also be understood as an additional economic stimulus to investors.
From a purely economic point of view, the following agents of restructuring can be distinguished in the Czech privatisation program: insiders, who meet (or not) the pressure from owners, strong outsiders, by which we understand direct investors (privatisation through direct sales, tenders, auctions), and dispersed or weak outsiders by which we understand small 4 4 We shall correct the wide-spread belief that privatisation was executed in the method of one input, one output. Often, different operational units of one big "input" company were privatised separately by different methods, to produce many "outputs", even in different sectors. In the case of voucher privatisation, the belief was that 100% of shares was privatised by vouchers. This also was not true, as the list of owners would often also contain foreign and domestic direct investors, National Property Fund, municipalities, banks, and restituents.
individual shareholders and investment privatisation funds (voucher privatisation). Strong outsiders are able and willing to exercise corporate control and hence to increase the performance of companies. Weak outsiders are expected to have lower incentives to monitor and control insiders, thus company performance and restructuring will depend much on the type of insider. Following Aghion et al. (1994) and Roland (1996) one can expect, due to the insider's objective function, a systematically worse performance of companies owned by weak outsiders.
The description presented above leads us to the formulation of the hypothesis, which we test in this paper: Is performance (or the restructuring pace) of voucher privatised companies worse than those of non-voucher privatised companies? And if so, is it because bad companies were selected for voucher privatisation, or because of weak corporate governance, i.e. the wrong ownership structure generated by vouchers? Finally, is voucher privatisation recommendable at all?
The model
Consider a government which has to decide on which company will be privatised by method A and which by method B. Method A is assumed to generate a dispersed ownership structure and thus delay restructuring, while method B is assumed to generate a well defined concentrated ownership structure and fast restructuring. In the presence of no restrictions, all companies will be privatised by method B. Now, let us assume that there are at least two important restrictions. First, a need to (i) quickly privatise a large number of enterprises so that they can undertake restructuring and bring positive results to the program as soon as possible, (ii) compensate and involve unwealthy citizens in the process, and (iii) build (through mentioned signalling) the credibility of the program and government, so that it will be reelected. Second, only a limited bulk of potential investments is available in the short run (in other words, a limited number of potential investors can be attracted in the short period). It is clear that these two restrictions are positively correlated, because rapid privatisation ensures the credibility of the program which then attracts more investors, who, while restructuring, signal to other investors that the program is credible. This will result in the acceleration of investment influx, privatisation, consequent restructuring pace and a better chance for government to stay in power. Now, let us consider a simple model. Assume a discount factor θ, 0<θ<1; value that a company privatised by method A brings to the government, Z A , and a value that a company privatised by method B brings to the government, Z B . It is believed that Z A <Z B , both positive. Let the number of companies to be privatised be n and, further, all companies be identical, so that n companies bring a total value to the government nZ j , j = A or B. Two periods for privatisation are available. Now, if the government decided to privatise all companies by method B, its payoff is
This is because outsider investment is available only to m companies in the first period. The rest is then privatised in the second period, when more risk averse investors arrive. However, if the government decided to overcome the restriction of limited investments, it could apply method A to the remaining companies in the first period. Its respective payoff then becomes
The difference between R BB and R AB is positive only if θ > Z A /Z B . If the government wanted to accelerate its gains from privatisation, in other words if it valued present more than future, then it would likely apply both methods in the first period.
In the presence of the two restrictions, the optimal choice of the government will be to privatise enterprises demanded by investors by method B, and the rest by method A. Note that the better enterprises are expected be privatised by B. Also, the proposed choice will partially correspond to Roland's (1996) policy advice that good companies should be privatised first, so that their success will signal that the program is feasible to others (including voters).
In order to specify our regression model correctly, we borrowed some ideas and tools from labour economics (particularly, from Willis and Rosen, 1979, and Revenga et al., 1992) . When estimating a treatment effect on two different samples, in which one was exposed to treatment while the second was not, which are suspected not to be selected randomly, the proper method is to apply a two-step regression specified by Heckman (1979) 6 . The basic intuition behind the model of Willis and Rosen was that one couldn't estimate the influence of given educational patterns by a simple comparison of today's earnings of graduates and a control group without correcting for their decision to join one of the patterns. Such self-selection can involve different family background and talent. Then, today's earnings can accurately measure the 7 initial abilities of the participants rather than the impact of a given type of education (or training).
7 Assume the regression model in the following form. Let n be the number of companies to be privatised, Z ij be the potential privatisation gain to government from company i if method j was chosen, w i a vector of company's observed restructuring potential and u i an unobserved part of the company's restructuring potential. The government can rank Z ij (w i ,u i ) for all i = 1,...,n in descending order, and decide to privatise first m (good) companies by method B, while remaining n -m by method A, because the best value of privatising a good company is ensured by method B, while the best value of privatising a bad company is ensured by method A 8 . This can be written as
It follows that since the proposed distribution of companies to privatisation groups A and B depends on (w, u), the actual restructuring efforts observed today may be non-random samples of the population of potential restructuring efforts, because the companies with better perspectives have a higher chance to be observed in B class, than in A. Now consider a difference in the potential privatisation gain of company i
Company i will be privatised by method A if Z iA > Z iB and by method B if Z iA ≤ Z iB . The selection rule can be specified as follows:
Perhaps the easiest explanation of selection-bias correction is the following: Imagine population of blue and red balls. Put the blue balls in box A and red balls in box B. Now, is it surprising that after five years one will find that all the balls in box A are still blue and that those in box B are still red? There is no impact as a result of being in different boxes for five years, if selection bias was considered. 
Where z is a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of method A "treatment". Our aim is to test for a difference in the current restructuring efforts of companies privatised by method A and B measured by variable y, which is a function of the company's observed specifications x i and unobserved specifications ε i , with respect to the of whole population. Our regression equation then is
We shall also assume that ε i and u i have bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ. 10 The expected value of restructuring measure y i for voucher companies then is:
The difference in the expected value of y i then is
And δ measures impact of type of corporate governance and ρσ ε impact of the selection bias. One can also see that by omitting λ i from the least square regression the coefficient of the dummy variable is overestimated, as it involves also the last (positive) term. The exercise was adopted from Greene (1993) , p. 713-14.
The data
Four data sets were applied. The first data set (Data1) contains information on all privatisation projects submitted by fall 1991 (see picture 1). We used it to determine the probability that an insider rather than outsider privatisation project would be approved, to highlight the importance of political consensus. The second data set (Data2) describes the characteristics of "output" companies as of 1991; those characteristics which could be observed by the government at the time when it decided on privatisation methods. The third data set (Data3) contains information on the performance of companies in 1994, disclosed in April 1995, and the last data set (Data4) contains the weighted prices of April 1995 from the Prague Stock Exchange. The Ministry of Privatisation and the National Property Fund compiled the first two data sets, the third and fourth data sets were available to the public for a small fee at the Prague Stock Exchange.
In what follows, we work with two samples of enterprises. The sample of voucher privatised companies, denoted by A, consists of 230 companies on which only voucher method was applied. In other words, vouchers privatised 100% of these companies' shares, although the ownership structure today may look rather different. This is due to a gradual concentration of ownership and the later buy-in of strong outsiders. The second sample, which we exaggerate a bit and call non-voucher companies, consists of 335 companies which, though partially voucher privatised, appeared to be partially sold to strong outsiders or remained in state hands in the National Property Fund (FNM). This selection of samples was made for several reasons: (i) data availability, (ii) as we have shown and as we show below, almost every company was partially privatised by vouchers and therefore the direct sale of 100 percent of shares to the strong outsider can be viewed in this framework as outlier, (iii) this selection allows us to test the hypothesis specified in section 2 of this paper. In the regressions presented in the appendix we used a different specification of samples to show how our results were sensitive to the data sample choice. Particularly, we included companies owned by more than 20% by FNM (whether temporarily or permanently), banks, municipalities or restituents, or owned by more than 0% by direct foreign or domestic investors in the non-voucher sample B1, while the other companies were included in the voucher sample A1. 
Estimations
Firstly, we estimate a possible bias from the selection of privatisation projects out of the 11,163 projects submitted. The information available for both submitted and selected projects was rather limited; only the total property of the company was considered in the project, and its distribution among different privatisation methods. In table 1 we submit the results of our estimation; clearly, projects submitted by insiders, which proposed transformation of a stateowned firm to a joint-stock company and then the application of the voucher method (the voucher method was specified separately and was highly correlated with methods D and E, which were its pre-requisites) were more likely to be successful. This is the expected result. The government signalled its willingness to apply the voucher method and managers reacted in a positive way, believing it would generate a dispersed ownership. One can see that the positive reaction of managers was crucial for privatisation at that point.
The selection of the privatisation method at this stage can be well explained by the different character of the property involved in the projects (a full description of "output" units privatised by each method can be obtained from the authors upon request). For instance, there were operational units with the character of a public utility, which belonged to big state-owned companies, and were "privatised" by municipalities (e.g. kindergartens). There were lands, houses and apartments that were "privatised" either by the individuals who had been using them, or by municipalities. Many restaurants and hotels that belonged to big companies were also privatised separately. Thus we can conclude that mainstream privatisation was indeed affected by insiders from the very beginning, and that the main stream was somehow related to voucher privatisation (whether it was 10 or 97% of shares to be distributed by vouchers). It is * Mean prior logarithm, in million Kcs. Winner is a dummy variable equal 1 if project was selected and 0 if it was not. Ln is a natural logarithm, and Mi is a percentage of the total property considered in the project privatised by method i. A denotes public auctions, B public tenders, C direct sales, D commercialisation of company into joint stock structure and consequent privatisation of shares, E privatisation of an already existing state owned joint stock company, and F free transfer to municipalities, pension funds, banks, or saving banks. Insider is a dummy variable equal 1 if the project was submitted by insiders and 0 otherwise. Res is a percentage of unsolved residual equal to the difference between property claimed and property distributed to all methods. Note that methods D and E very highly correlated with a voucher method. See also table A1.
important to note that this selection bias has no impact on the average manufacturing company privatised in the Czech privatisation program. According to our model, the government based its selection decision on observed information about restructuring potential in privatised companies. We applied all data available to us, particularly the assets to labour ratio, the profitability of labour, revenues on labour, and bank loans on labour. The estimation result suggests that undercapitalised, low profit and revenues companies were the most likely to be selected for pure voucher privatisation (see table 2; for  samples A1 and B1 see table A2 . The assets to labour ratio did not play any role there, while the indebtedness coefficient was negative and significant.) Indeed, this supports the assumption of the model. Having estimated the selection rule equation, we calculated a new variable lambda to be plugged into the regressions of the performance measures as a corrector of selection bias.
The measures of performance or restructuring efforts are usually constrained by data availability. From our data we could utilise the following information, as our left-hand-side variables: 1. Stock exchange prices as the best complex evaluation measure of company performance and restructuring progress which have been made or is believed to be made. 2.
Difference in prices at stock exchange in April 1995 and equilibrium prices from the voucher market in 1992. More direct measures involved 3. Return on assets, 4. Return on equity, and Picture 2. Description of variables. Price = Average price of shares on Prague stock exchange in April 1995, weighted by volume traded. CHPrice = Price on equilibrium price of voucher market in 1992. ROA = Return on assets. Net income on total assets. ROE = Return on equity. Net income on total equity. SA = Sales on total assets. Sales = revenues from merchandise sold + revenues from own manufactured products sold + capitalisation + sundry operating revenues. INTR = Inventory turnover. LOEQ = Short term and long term bank loans on equity. PS = Income from operations on sales. Income from operations = earnings from operations before other items and tax. EQAS = Total equity on total assets. Z = dummy equal 1 if voucher privatised, 0 otherwise. Logarithmic transformation was applied to all variables, except for ROA and ROE. 5. Profit margin on sales. The selection of the explanatory, or right-hand-side, variables again depended on availability. We tried to include all variables, which could be expected to have any influence on dependent variables. For the list and description, see Picture 2.
In table 3 we display our estimates of the five measures. (1) Price is positively correlated with returns on assets, sales on assets, and profit on sales, and negatively correlated with inventory turnover (less inventory in stock brings a higher price; significant on 0.11), indebtedness, and equity to assets ratio (less shares outstanding for the same asset value). All this could be expected. Coefficient of Z is significant, negative and smaller than coefficient on the same dummy generated by the OLS, which is roughly the same as expected value displayed in table 4. The true negative impact of 100% voucherisation is therefore even bigger than what is observed.
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(2) Signs of coefficients on explanatory variables for ChPrice are the same as for Price, except for the dummy variable Z. While the positive coefficient on zet calculated by the OLS 1 11 1 The positive coefficient of λ shows that the observed prices of voucher privatised companies are lower compared with the prices that would have been observed for the average member of this sample. At the same time it suggests that the observed prices of non-voucher privatised companies are higher compared with the prices that would have been observed for the average member of this sample. However, in this case, negative δ dominates. regression is significant (zet observed), the true value is insignificant. There is no difference in after-voucher price development between the samples.
(3, 4) Return on assets, ROA, and Return on equity, ROE, increase with higher sales on assets and equity on assets, and decrease with higher inventory turnover or profit margin on sales, respectively. The coefficients on lambda and Z are both significant. While voucherised companies are observed to have ROA lower and ROE higher than non-voucherised, the corporate governance effects are in fact in both cases negative. (5) Gross profit on sales, PS, is positively correlated with equity on assets, and negatively correlated with sales on assets and returns on equity. Dummy Z is negative and significant, again higher than if calculated by the OLS regression (or observed).
In the appendix tables A2, A3 and A4 we present the same calculations for different sample specification (A1 and B1; A1 consists from companies without domestic or foreign direct investor, and without other outsiders holding individually at least 20% of shares). Again, corporate governance effect of voucherisation is even more negative than observed. The postvoucher price development is the same for both the samples. Our controlling regressions thus confirmed results from first estimations.
Conclusion
Voucher privatisation is widely believed to generate the wrong ownership structure in the sense that it does not generate the right incentives to improve the performance of companies in the desired speed or way. Thus, the application of the voucher method was made highly questionable. In this paper, a simple model of government choice of privatisation techniques is presented in order to explain what may lead government to apply a combination of standard and non-standard (voucher) privatisation methods. Then, Heckman's two step regression is applied on several measures of performance. This regression is often used in labour economics when it has to correct for self-selection bias, sometimes called talent of applicant. It appears that the stock exchange evaluates non-voucher companies higher than voucher companies and that all other examined measures tend to be higher for the first mentioned as well. For The policy advice is straightforward. Use vouchers in combination with other methods. However, try to avoid full voucherisation. It is also possible to view the stock exchange price as a measure of future performance, while other dependent variables (like profitability) as measures of restructuring already undertaken. 12 Then, due to the short after-privatisation period, a few differences between the samples would be observed in the measures of the recent past, and the true difference would be measured only by the measure of the future, i.e. the stock exchange price. Unfortunately, we have to accept that we do not really know what that price actually means: A majority of trading with shares (often estimated at as high as 90%) is done off the stock exchange, and the demand reflects a gradual concentration of ownership, the "third wave" of privatisation. In the first case, we can argue that the stock exchange price is the best approximation of true price, but in the second case, we are not so certain. Demand due to concentration can be very sensitive to new legislation on the protection of the minority shareholder. Demand can also reflect a concentration of market power within industries, as a response to actual or expected openness of the Czech market to foreign competition. The relationship between the stock exchange price as the LHS variable, and the detailed ownership structure together with market power as the RHS variables would be an interesting topic for future research, if data on new ownership structures were available.
Obviously, it would also help to collect more data on randomly selected companies privatised by other methods, like manager buy-outs or employee ownership. However, one should be very careful to distinguish between industry and company specific features. It would hardly make any sense to compare a few successful state monopolies or pharmaceutical companies privatised by Western investors with the average Czech company.
1 12 2 Here we benefited from a discussion with Francesca Cornelli. Kcs, 1991 . Note that numbers of property distribution in methods are to be taken as estimates rather than exact values, as they do not add up to the total property involved. The sum of total property involved is obviously much higher than the value of all 2,876 firms. 
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